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ABSTRACT  
The study of interaction among insider ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, invest-
ment decision, and business risk is still conducted. This research aims at investigating the 
influencing factors of insider ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, investment decision, 
business risk, and the interaction among insider ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, 
investment decision, and business risk. The samples of the research are 137 manufacturing 
companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange from the year 2006 to 2010. The three 
stages least square simultaneous equation model is used to analyze the interaction among 
insider ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, investment decision, and business risk. The 
analysis result of insider ownership equation shows that investment, business risk, and size 
have negative influence on insider ownership. Insider ownership, debt and business risk 
give negative impact to dividend that is shown on equation of dividend. Negative impact of 
dividend, business risk, and profitability to debt is shown on equation of debt. The analysis 
result of investment equation shows that insider ownership and business risk have negative 
influence on investment, whereas profitability and sales growth have positive influence on 
investment. The analysis result of business risk equation shows that insider ownership, 
dividend, investment, and size have negative influence on business risk, whereas variability 
of earnings has positive influence on business risk. The analysis result of the interaction 
among insider ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, investment decision, and business 
risk shows that: 1) there are reciprocal interactions among insider ownership, investment, 
and business risk; 2) there are reciprocal interactions between dividend and debt; 3) there 
are reciprocal interactions between dividend and business risk; 4) insider ownership influ-
ences dividend; 5) business risk influences debt. The empirical evidence of interaction 
among insider ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, investment decision, and business 
risk helps the companies to make financial policy minimize agency problem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conflict of interest and asymmetric infor-
mation results in agency problem that can 
arise among shareholders, managers, and 
creditors. Financial policy is prone to be made 
by managers to maximize prosperity of their 
own and not of the shareholders. The disparity 
of income earned is to be the cause of the rise 
of conflict among the shareholders and credi-
tors. Asymmetric information results in the 
use of the policy made by managers for 
detecting the company’s prospect. Insider 
ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, and 
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investment decision can be used for agency 
problem minimization. Financial policies are 
made in order to make business risk more 
controllable. 
This research is conducted to analyze in-
teractions among insider ownership, dividend 
policy, debt policy, investment decision, and 
business risk. So far, some research has been 
conducted to observe interactions among sev-
eral variables, while research that observes 
interactions among insider ownership, divi-
dend policy, debt policy, investment policy, 
and business risk has not been carried out yet. 
This interaction is interesting to study more 
thoroughly through empirical analysis in this 
research. Jensen, et al., 1992) observed the 
interaction among insider ownership, debt, and 
dividend. Adedeji (1998) observed the inter-
action among dividend, debt, and investment. 
Chen et al. (1999) observed the interaction 
among managerial ownership, risk taking, debt 
policy, and dividend policy. Wibowo & 
Erkaningrum (2002) observed interaction 
among dividend, debt, and investment in 
Indonesia.  
The major objectives that this research is 
expected to achieve is to examine empirically: 
1) influencing factors towards insider owner-
ship; 2) influencing factors towards dividend 
policy; 3) influencing factors towards debt 
policy; 4) influencing factors towards invest-
ment decision; 5) influencing factors towards 
business risk; and 6) interaction among insider 
ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, in-
vestment decision, and business risk. 
LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
The interaction among insider ownership, 
dividend policy, debt policy, investment deci-
sion, and business risk can be explained by 
agency theory and signaling theory. The dif-
ferent interests among the shareholders, man-
agers, and creditor are to create inter-group 
conflict, which is called agency problem. Pa-
padopoulos and Charalambidis (2007) stated 
that agency problem is interest conflict that 
can arise: 1) between the shareholders and 
managers, and; 2) between the shareholders 
and creditor. The interest conflict between the 
shareholders and managers arises because the 
policy that the managers made is prioritized to 
maximize their own prosperity over that of the 
shareholders. While the interest conflict be-
tween the shareholders and creditors arises as 
the result of the fact that the obligation owners 
generally earn steady income regardless of the 
good performance of the company, whereas 
the shareholders will earn larger income along 
with the better performance of the company. 
Asymmetric information results in man-
ager of having better information on the com-
pany’s prospect than the investors do. Berk & 
DeMarzo (2011) declared that asymmetric 
information occurs when managers have better 
information from the investors. Creditors are 
outsider party that suffers from the loss of in-
formation equal to that obtained by the exter-
nal shareholders. Bebczuk (2003) affirmed 
asymmetric information in financial contract 
every time the loan giver does not have the 
necessary information for identifying the 
creditor’s capability in paying off its debt. 
Pecking order theory is one of theories on 
funding decision based on asymmetric infor-
mation. Myers (1984) argued that the decision 
of funding based on pecking order theory, 
which was stated in 1961, follows the se-
quence of funding; 1) a company prefers in-
ternal-resource funding; 2) a company adjusts 
the target of dividend payment to the invest-
ment opportunity; 3) dividend policy is sticky, 
profitability fluctuation and investment op-
portunity gives impact on larger or smaller 
internal cash flow than investment expendi-
ture; 4) if external fund is required, a company 
prefers debt-resource funding as it is regarded 
safer than publicizing new equity as the last 
option to meet the need of investment. 
Share and obligation publication is done 
when a company needs external funding. With 
the availability of asymmetric information can 
help market to detect the prospect of a com-
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pany through managerial behavior in making 
financial decision. A company with poor pros-
pect is inclined to fund the investment by 
issuing shares in order to share the loss with 
new investors. The new share publication is 
interpreted as bad news that results in the 
company value reflected by the decreasing 
value of share price. While a company with 
good prospect is prone to avoiding share sale 
and attempts additional capital using other 
efforts, including the use of debt over the tar-
get of normal capital structure. Ghosh, et al. 
(2008) stated that managers of good-prospect 
Company would give signals to the investors 
by issuing debt instead of self-capital. The use 
of debt over the target of normal capital 
structure will enlarge flat-interest burden and 
bring about the company’s financial distress. 
The use of interest-loaded debt has advantage 
and weakness. Ross, et al. (2010) declared that 
in the financial perspective, the major differ-
ences between debt and self-capital are: 1) 
debt does not belong to company’s ownership, 
creditor does not have any right to vote; 2) 
debt interest payment is a business operational 
cost that can reduce the burden of tax, divi-
dend for the shareholders, and the company’s 
tax; 3) an unpaid-off debt is the company’s 
responsibility. 
Interest conflict and asymmetric informa-
tion influence a company’s financial policy. 
The tendency of the management to make 
policy that will maximize its own prosperity 
rather than that of the shareholders requires 
the shareholders to expend cost for controlling 
management activity to make it consistent 
with the contract agreement among the share-
holders, managers, and creditors. Agency cost 
is cost expended for overcoming agency 
problem. Ghosh, et al. (2008) perceived not 
only does the interaction among the share-
holders and the managers cause agency cost, 
but also the interaction among the loan givers 
and the creditors cause agency cost. This 
agency cost will be high if the shareholders 
always control every management’s action. It 
will be low if the management is less moti-
vated to elevate its own prosperity.  
A company minimizes the costs that result 
from agency problem and asymmetric infor-
mation by optimizing insider ownership and 
other financial policies like dividend policy, 
debt policy, and investment decision. Optimi-
zation of insider ownership and financial poli-
cies make business risk more controllable. 
Insider ownership and financial policies are 
helpful in overcoming asymmetric information 
between managers and external investors 
(Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977). Jensen et 
al. (1992) stated that agency and signaling 
theory indicates that debt, dividend, and 
insider ownership is not only related to special 
attributes of the similar companies, but also 
directly inter-relevant to each other. Chen et 
al. (1999) stated fact that managerial owner-
ship, risk taking, debt policy, and dividend 
policy are integral part of the company’s deci-
sion-making process in the agency framework. 
The ownership of shares by management 
(insider ownership) is a policy to reduce inter-
est conflict between the shareholders and the 
managers. The shareholders control the com-
pany by selecting a group of people who have 
authority to make decision in the company. 
Hua (2006) revealed the opinion of Agrawal & 
Mandelker (1987), Lewellen, et al. (1985) that 
insider shareholdings help overcome agency 
problem between the managers and the 
shareholders upon doing supervision. Insider 
ownership is reflected from the percentage of 
the company’s shares owned by directors and 
commissioners. Directors and commissioners 
will allocate a great amount of their wealth for 
the company. Domash (2010) affirmed that in-
sider ownership is usually stated by the per-
centage of flowing shares held by insiders. 
Insider ownership gives advantage in rele-
vance with the controlling potentials of man-
agers who have large interest toward the com-
pany. The largest advantage will manifest if 
asymmetric information between insiders and 
outsiders reaches its highest level. However, 
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there will only be little advantage obtained 
from this form of insider ownership, if outsid-
ers know something about the company and 
the managerial effort as much as that known 
by insiders. Insider ownership makes man-
agement able to manage and make financial 
policies better, so that business risk can be 
more controllable. 
Dividend policy is a policy that can be 
used to reduce agency problem. Baker (2009) 
stated that dividend policy could play an 
important role in reducing agency problem 
between the managers and the external share-
holders. The company makes dividend policy 
that can create equality among the current 
dividends and growth in the future so that it 
can maximize the share price. The increasing 
of the share price means promoting the share-
holders’ prosperity. 
Even though dividend policy can enhance 
the prosperity of the shareholders, the high 
payment of dividend will give impact on the 
limited fund available for investors. Besley & 
Brigham (2012b) stated that residual dividend 
policy is a policy in which the paid dividend 
equals the actual profit subtracted to the profit 
restrained for funding the company’s capital 
budget optimally. The company is exposed to 
making decision on distributing profit in the 
form of dividend or holding it back to be 
invested back to the company. The company’s 
decision to invest will enhance the company’s 
value that is reflected from the share price. 
The increase of share price will maximize the 
shareholder’s prosperity. 
Debt policy enables creditor to obtain 
more information on the company’s prospect. 
The shareholders make into good use of debt 
policy to share the cost of supervision with the 
obligation owners/holders in as such that man-
agement is encouraged to act disciplinarily to 
avoid bankruptcy. Jensen (1986) argued that 
debt can also function to reduce agency cost 
concerning with free cash flow. Liquidation or 
reorganization will be the consequences of the 
company’s bankruptcy if creditors claim for 
the company’s asset as the result of its inabil-
ity to pay off its debt. Therefore, one of the 
debt publication costs is the possibility of 
financial failure. Ghosh, et al. (2008) stated 
that a company would suffer bankruptcy, as it 
is not able to fulfill its obligation to the credi-
tors, which are mostly due to the business and 
financial risks. Moyer, et al. (2012) stated that 
business risk is the variability or uncertainty of 
the company’s operational income. Ehrhardt & 
Brigham (2011) stated that financial risk is 
additional risk for the common shareholders 
because of the decision of debt funding. The 
use of debt will enhance the risk of the share-
holders. The shareholders’ risk will increase if 
the company’s business is not in well condi-
tion, the operational income will be low and 
insufficient to cover the interest so that the 
owner’s wealth will reduce even in an extreme 
condition the company can experience bank-
ruptcy. This explanation above shows the 
interaction of insider ownership, dividend 
policy, debt policy, investment decision, and 
business risk. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
1. The influential factors towards insider 
ownership. 
Influential factors towards insider owner-
ship are empirically examined using seven 
determinants, i.e. dividend, debt, investment, 
business risk, profitability, sales growth, and 
size. A company with high payment of divi-
dend is prone to making the share ownership 
by management become high, because of the 
high level of dividend payment, as the high 
level of dividend payment, will encourage 
management to own the company’s shares. 
The shareholders expect larger dividend at 
present and in the future than that of the pre-
vious years. The increase of dividend payment 
will likely increase the share price. The in-
crease of the share price will likely increase 
the shareholders’ prosperity. Omran & Pointon 
(2004) found out that dividend determined the 
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share price that was actively marketed in 
Egypt Stock Exchange. 
The use of large debt tends to make the 
level of share ownership by management low, 
because the higher debt, the higher risk the 
shareholders bear. The shareholders’ wealth 
reduces when the company undergoes finan-
cial distress to fulfill its obligations, even in an 
extreme condition, it will suffer bankruptcy. 
Berk & DeMarzo (2011) stated that the use of 
debt increases the risk of the shareholders, 
even upon the company’s never-going-bank-
rupt condition. The liquidation cost leads to 
negative correlation between debt and insider 
ownership (Friend & Hashrouck, 1987; Friend 
& Lang, 1988). 
The number of investment opportunity 
gives positive signal about the company’s 
prospect and growth in the future, so it will 
enhance the value of the company reflected 
from the price share. Management is encour-
aged to own the company’s shares if the value 
of the company increases. Eckbo (2008) put 
forward the opinion of Modigliani & Miller 
(1961) that investment policy determines the 
value of the company and payment is a residue 
between income and investment. 
A company with high business risk is in-
clined to make the level of shares ownership 
by management low, as management is prone 
to restrict itself to be the owner of the com-
pany upon knowing that the company faces 
high business risk. Alice, et al. (2009) af-
firmed that when a company uses debt or 
financial leverage, business and finance risk is 
borne on the shareholders. 
A company that can produce high earn-
ings will encourage management to own the 
company’s share, because the high profit will 
elevate dividend distributed to the sharehold-
ers and enhance the value of the company re-
flected from the share price. Barnes (2009) 
stated that the business value is determined by 
profitability, or to be more exact, the expected 
profitability in the future. 
Sales growth reflects one of the measure-
ments for the level of success or realization of 
the company’s past growth and becomes the 
measuring rod for its future growth. A com-
pany with high sales growth is inclined to en-
courage management to hold the company’s 
shares, as the future high growth will increase 
the value of the company. Meier, et al. (2005) 
stated that the steps of increasing the com-
pany’s value over the level of sale growth and 
common profit become important matter. 
Large-size company reflects the com-
pany’s past performance and becomes the in-
dicator the company’s performance in the 
future. The development of the company’s 
performance from time to time will encourage 
management to hold the company’s share be-
cause the amount of earnings that will be 
received by the company in the future. Galla-
gher & Andrew (2007) exposed that the size is 
expected to give cash flows in the future; the 
amount of cash inflows in the future will 
increase the share price. The hypothetical for-
mula based on the above explanation and 
research outcome is: 
H1a = Dividend has positive influence on 
insider ownership   
H1b = Debt has negative influence on insiders 
ownership  
H1c = Investment has positive influence on 
insider ownership  
H1d = Business risk has negative influence on 
insider ownership  
H1e = Profitability has positive influence on 
insider ownership  
H1f = Sales growth has positive influence on 
insider ownership  
H1g = Size has positive influence on insider 
ownership  
2.  The influential factors towards dividend 
The influential factors towards dividend is 
examined empirically using seven determi-
nant, namely, insider ownership, debt, invest-
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ment, business risk, profitability, sales growth, 
and variability of earnings. A company with 
high insider ownership is prone to paying high 
dividend, as the high payment of dividend will 
push conflict between managers and the 
shareholders. Bose (2010) stated that if man-
agement is strong enough to control the com-
pany (due to the substantial shares ownership), 
it will have high dividend payout ratio. 
A company with good prospect is inclined 
to use debt as alternative to meet the need of 
dividend payment in short term, if the com-
pany does not have any internal funding to 
meet the necessity of fund. However, if a 
company’s prospect is poor, it will create con-
tinuous use of debt, consequently it will over-
come problem by adjusting dividend payout 
ratio to the new earning level. Ehrhardt & 
Brigham (2011) stated that the available cash 
to be distributed to the shareholders depends 
on the profitability, investment, and debt. Ad-
edeji (1998) found out that financial leverage 
has positive influence on dividend payout ra-
tio.  
A company with investment opportunity is 
inclined to pay low dividend, in order to in-
crease the proportion of internal equity that is 
used for funding investment. Besley & Brig-
ham (2012a) stated that dividend policy is 
much influenced by the investment opportu-
nity and the availability of fund used to fi-
nance new investment. Investment has nega-
tive influence on dividend (Jensen, 1986; 
Jensen, et al., 1992; Adedeji, 1998; Chay, 
2005). 
A company with high business risk is 
prone to paying low dividend, as the high 
business risk makes the uncertainty of profit-
ability level at present and in the future. The 
uncertainty of profitability results in the lim-
ited fund available to pay dividend. Baker 
(2009) stated that a company with high risk is 
encouraged to decrease the dividend payout 
ratio. Jensen, et al. (1992) found out that busi-
ness risk has negative influence on dividend. 
A company that produces high earnings is 
inclined to paying high dividend, as the higher 
profitability makes the larger fund available to 
pay dividend. Bose (2010) stated that when 
earnings rise, dividend would also rise if the 
company can maintain the new level in the 
future. Profitability has positive influence on 
dividend (Jensen, et al., 1992).  
A company with high sales growth is in-
clined to limit the payment of dividend in or-
der to enhance the proportion of internal 
equity, which is used to elevate its growth. 
Barclay, et al. (1999) stated that a company 
with high growth requires more fund, as there 
are more opportunities for investment so that it 
tends to pay lower dividend than a company 
with low growth does. Jensen, et al., (1992) 
found out that growth has negative influence 
on dividend. 
A company with stable earnings level can 
maintain the payment of dividend without 
having to risk cutting dividend in the future, as 
the company can predict the future earnings 
with higher level of accuracy. Chandra (2008) 
stated that dividend policy fluctuates along 
with earnings, resulting in the direct transmis-
sion of variability of earnings with dividend. 
The hypothetical formula, based on the above 
explanation and research outcome is: 
H2a = Insider ownership has positive influ-
ence on dividend  
H2b = Debt has positive influence on dividend  
H2c = Investment has negative influence on 
dividend  
H2d =  Business risk has negative influence on 
dividend  
H2e = Profitability has positive influence on 
dividend  
H2f = Sales growth has negative influence on 
dividend  
H2g = Variability of earnings has negative 
influence on dividend  
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3.  The influential factors towards debt. 
The influential factors toward debt are 
examined empirically using seven determi-
nants, namely, insider ownership, dividend, 
investment, business risk, profitability, vari-
ability of earnings, and structure of assets. A 
company with high level of insider ownership 
is prone to using low debt to anticipate the 
possibility of financial distress resulting from 
the use of debt. The shareholders’ risks rise, 
when the company does not have adequate 
capacity to close interest, so that the share-
holders’ wealth reduces even in an extreme 
condition, the company can go bankrupt. In-
sider ownership has negative influence on the 
financial policy (Friend & Hasbrouck, 1987; 
Friend & Lang, 1988; Jensen, et al., 1992). 
A company that pays high dividend is in-
clined to use larger debt because the high 
payment of dividend will increase the need of 
cash in the future and will result in the limited 
retained earning that can be used to overcome 
the need of fund. The limit of retained earning 
encourages the use of larger debt. Banerjee 
(2010) stated that the decision of funding in 
turn, will influence and be influenced by divi-
dend policy, for retained earnings used up for 
internal funding shows the agreed dividend by 
the shareholders. Dividend has positive influ-
ence on debt (Baskin, 1989; Adedeji, 1998). 
A company with more opportunities for 
investment is inclined to use larger debt if its 
internal equity to finance investment does not 
suffice. Baker & Martin (2011) stated that 
Mackay (2003) found out the company’s 
specific factor, like flexibility on production 
and investment area has an important impli-
cation towards the company’s structure of 
finance. Investment has positive correlation 
with financial leverage (Baskin, 1989; Chang 
& Rhee, 1990; Adedeji, 1998). 
A company with high business risk tends 
to use low debt, because the high business risk 
makes the current and future level of profit-
ability uncertain. The uncertainty of profit-
ability decreases the quantity of debt received 
by the company. Besides, the large debt will 
also enlarge the flat-interest burden and will 
result in the company’s financial distress. 
Ehrhardt & Brigham (2011) stated that a 
company with high operating leverage, and 
thus, meaning a larger business risk, will limit 
the use of financial leverage.  
A company with high level of profitability 
is inclined to use low debt because the high 
profitability result in the larger retained earn-
ing available as an internal resource to meet 
the need of fund. Melicher & Norton (2011) 
revealed that a more profitable company is 
inclined to use smaller debt. Profitability has 
negative correlation towards leverage (Baskin, 
1989; Chang & Ree, 1990; Jensen, et al., 
1992; Allen, 1993; Pandey, 2001; Shumi, 
2005; Hyesung, et al., 2006; Tran & 
Neelakantan, 2006). 
 A company with high level of unstable 
earnings has limitation to obtain loan because 
of the distrust of the loan giver. The distrust 
results from the uncertainty of the loan giver 
about the company’s capability to reach the 
expected profit in the future. Kent & Martin 
(2011) revealed that high cash flow volatility 
brings about the potential high cost of finan-
cial distress, and either trade-off theory or 
pecking order theory predicts the negative 
correlation between volatility and leverage. 
A company with assets of high collateral 
value can obtain larger loan as the company 
can fulfill its obligations with those assets 
upon facing bankruptcy. Galindo & Schian-
tarelli (2003) found out that the company size 
and tangibility of assets are influential toward 
long-term debt. Structure of assets has positive 
correlation with leverage (Adedeji, 1998). The 
formulation of hypothesis based the above 
explanation and research outcome is: 
H3a = Insider ownership has negative influ-
ence on debt  
H3b = Dividend has positive influence on debt  
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H3c =  Investment has positive influence on 
debt  
H3d =  Business risk has negative influence on 
debt  
H3e = Profitability has negative influence on 
debt  
H3f = Variability of earnings has negative 
influence on debt  
H3g = Structure of assets has negative influ-
ence on debt  
4. The influential factors towards invest-
ment. 
The influential factors towards investment 
are examined empirically using seven determi-
nants, which are: insider ownership, dividend, 
debt, business risk, profitability, sales growth 
and Q ratio. A company with the high level of 
insider ownership is inclined to put large in-
vestment, as the shareholder expect the in-
crease of the share price resulting from posi-
tive signal on the company’s prospect in the 
future that is arisen by the large investment the 
company puts. 
A company that pays high dividend tends 
to have limitation in making investment, be-
cause the high payment of dividend causes the 
limited retained earnings that can be used by 
the company to put investment in the follow-
ing period. Dividend has negative influence on 
the investment in the following period 
(Baskin, 1989; Allen, 1993; Adedeji, 1998). A 
company with good prospect has tendency to 
use debt to make good use of the investment 
opportunities, if the company has limited in-
ternal fund. However, if the company’s pros-
pect is not well, it will make the necessity of 
fund last incessantly, so that the company 
overcomes the necessity of fund with new 
investment opportunity. Banerjee (2010) 
stated that the investment decision in pur-
chasing new project capital requires the deci-
sion of funding. Financial leverage has posi-
tive correlation with investment (Baskin, 
1989; Allen, 1993; Tong & Green, 2005). 
A company with high business risk is in-
clined to make low investment, because the 
high business risk makes the uncertainty of the 
profitability level at present and in the future. 
The uncertainty of profitability will create the 
limited internal fund available to make in-
vestment. Madura (2007) stated that when the 
businesses owner judges the possibility of 
investment in any business, he would consider 
the potential return and risk of a kind of in-
vestment. 
A company with high profitability has lar-
ger capability to collect investment fund, 
because the high level of earnings produced 
will result in the larger amount of internal fund 
available for making investment. Profitability 
has positive correlation with the investment 
(Baskin, 1989; Tong & Green, 2005). 
A company with high sales growth has 
many opportunities to make investment, be-
cause sales growth reflects the realization of 
the past investment and becomes the barome-
ter of future investment. Fama (1974) ob-
served that sales growth has positive influence 
on the investment in America. Alice, et al. 
(2009) put forward that the recent years ten-
dencies for companies with high growth; ei-
ther those of manufacturing company or other 
companies from business sector, are promot-
ing efficiency through the enhancement of 
capital investment. 
Q ratio variable, which is stated with price 
to book value ratio, has positive influence on 
investment. Q ratio has positive influence on 
investment (Adedeji, 1998; Baskin, 1989). The 
hypothetical formula, based on the above 
explanation and research outcome is: 
H4a = Insider ownership has positive influ-
ence on investment  
H4b = Dividend has negative on investment  
H4c =  Debt has positive influence on invest-
ment  
H4d =  Business risk has negative influence on 
investment  
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H4e = Profitability has positive influence on 
investment  
H4f = Sales growth has positive influence on 
investment  
H4g = Q ratio has positive influence on 
investment  
5. The influential factors towards business 
risk.  
The influential factors towards business 
risk are examined empirically using seven 
determinants, which are insider ownership, 
dividend, debt, investment, liquidity, variabil-
ity of earnings, and size. A company with high 
level of insider ownership is inclined to con-
trol the company by making financial policy 
that leads to low business risk, because the 
low business risk is borne by the shareholders. 
May (1995) found out the reversed causal cor-
relation of managerial ownership towards 
business risk.  
A company with high payment of divi-
dend tends to have high business risk, because 
the high payment of dividend causes the lim-
ited retained earning that can be used by the 
company to make investment in the subse-
quent period. The limited opportunities for the 
company to make investment results in the 
high business risk because of the incapability 
of the company to produce profit due to the 
low sales. Venkatesh (1989) found out the 
dividend policy has influence on the risk. 
The use of large debt will increase the 
business risk, because the high use of debt will 
increase the probability of the company of 
going through financial distress, because the 
high flat interest burden. The large interest 
burden will cause the high business risk be-
cause the company’s operational activities 
become disturbed. Kent & Martini (2011) 
stated that the company’s capital structure is 
determining directly the risk and cost of capi-
tal entirely. 
A company that has many opportunities 
for investment is inclined to have low business 
risk, because the large opportunity for invest-
ment gives possibility for the company to pro-
duce high profit resulting from the high sale. 
Harris & Mongiello (2006) stated that the 
policy for operation, investment, funding and 
dividend influence the business risk and finan-
cial risk and eventually systematic risk. 
A company with high level of liquidity is 
inclined to have low business risk, because the 
high level of liquidity shows the capability of 
the company in fulfilling its obligations that 
will due. The high level of liquidity will cause 
low business risk because of the absence of 
obstacles for the company in doing the com-
pany’s operational activity. Khan (2002) stated 
that the major risks come from inflation mar-
ket, interest rate, business, liquidity, currency, 
as well as specific risks. 
A company with high level of unstable 
earnings is inclined to have large business risk, 
because the difficulty for the company to 
predict future earnings causes the uncertainty 
of the company in making investment. The 
uncertainty of the company to make invest-
ment results in high business risk because the 
process of selecting investment is not optimal. 
Mayo (2012) stated the increase of variability 
of business profit would enhance the com-
pany’s business risk. 
A company with big size is prone to hav-
ing low business risks, because the large size 
of company reflects the effectiveness of the 
company’s performance from time to time and 
indicates the future performance of it. Zion & 
Shalit (1975) declared that big-sized company 
has lower risk than small company does. The 
hypothetical formulation based on the above 
explanation and research outcome is:  
H5a = Insider ownership has negative influ-
ence on business risk  
H5b = Dividend has positive influence on 
business risk  
H5c =  Debt has positive influence on business 
risk  
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H5d =  Investment has negative influence on 
business risk  
H5e = Liquidity has negative influence on 
business risk  
H5f = Variability of earnings has positive 
influence on business risk  
H5g = Size has negative influence on business 
risk  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
a.  Population and Sample  
Anderson et al. (2011) stated that popula-
tion is a group of elements of an interest in a 
specific research. Population employed in this 
research is manufacturing company that has 
publicized a complete financial report at Indo-
nesia Capital Market Directory since 2006 
until 2010. The selection of manufacturing 
company as its population is because the re-
search will be more relevant if it is carried out 
on the same types of industry (considering the 
difference characteristics among industries) 
and the amount of manufacturing industry 
registered in Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
The research sample collection is done 
using method of purposive sampling. Sekaran 
& Bougie (2010) stated that the research 
sample collection using this purposive sam-
pling method is a process of collecting sam-
ples referring to the type of special person who 
can provide the wanted information either be-
cause they are the only ones that own the in-
formation or because the information is ad-
justed to the criteria established by the re-
searcher. The criteria used is manufacturing 
company with data about insider ownership, 
dividend, debt, investment, business risk, 
profitability, sales growth, size, variability of 
earnings, structure of assets, Q ratio, and li-
quidity. Data pooling is carried out by adding 
companies that can fulfill the research criteria 
in five-year research period. Companies that 
can fulfill the criteria are 137 companies. 
b.  Research Variables 
This research hypothetical examination 
employs variables that refer to the size of re-
searches ever conducted. Variables of debt, 
business risk, and profitability refer to the re-
search size of Jensen at al. (1992). Variables 
of dividend, investment, sales growth, size, 
variability of earnings, structure of assets, Q 
ratio, and liquidity refer to the research size of 
Adedeji (1998).  
INS = Insider Ownership is measured 
with the percentage of the com-
pany’s shares owned by directors 
and commissioners.  
DIV  =  Dividend is measured with divi-
dend divided by earnings after tax 
DE = Debt is measured with ratio of 
long-term debt to the book value of 
total assets 
INV =  Investment is measured with (total 
assets t - total assets t-1) divided by 
total assets t-1 
BRISK  = Business risk is measured with 
standard deviation of the first dif-
ference in operating income divided 
by total assets 
PRO = Profitability is measured with ratio 
of operating income to total assets  
GRO =  Sales growth is measured with 
(salest - salest-1) divided by sales t-1 
SZ = Size is measured with the natural 
logarithm of total assets 
VAR = Variability of earnings is presented 
with the standard deviation of (an-
nual change in profit before interest 
and tax divided by total assets) 
STR = Structure of assets is measured with 
total net fixed assets divided by 
market value of the firm 
Q  =  Q ratio is measured with price to 
book value ratio 
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LIQ  =  Liquidity is measured with current 
assets minus stocks and divided by 
current liabilities 
c.  Hypothetical Examination Model  
This research hypothesis is examined us-
ing simultaneous equation model of three 
stage least square (3 SLS). This equation 
model is used because this simultaneous equa-
tion model of three stage least square (3 SLS) 
is a method in which all equations in model 
are made into account altogether and predicted 
simultaneously by noticing the whole limita-
tion at the equation system in the model. 
The simultaneous equation model em-
ployed to observe reciprocal interactions 
among variables of insider ownership, divi-
dend, debt, investment, and business risk is:  
INS =  ƒ (DIV, DE, INV, BRISK, PRO, 
GRO, SZ) 
DIV =  ƒ (INS, DE, INV, BRISK, PRO, 
GRO, VAR) 
DE  =  ƒ (INS, DIV, INV, BRISK, PRO, 
VAR, STR) 
INV =  ƒ (INS, DIV, DE, BRISK, PRO, 
GRO, Q) 
BRISK =  ƒ (INS, DIV, DE, INV, LIQ, VAR, 
SZ) 
THE OUTCOME OF DATA ANALYSIS  
Table 1 indicates that investment, business 
risk, and size has negative influence on insider 
ownership, whereas dividend, debt, profitabil-
ity and sales growth does not have any influ-
ence on insider ownership. Negative coeffi-
cient on investment variable shows that Indo-
nesian shareholders prefer that dividends be 
distributed to the shareholders in the form of 
dividend than be retained in the company for 
investment. Dividend is regarded to give cer-
tainty than investment. Negative coefficient 
variable of size shows that small company 
gives bigger authority and larger control by 
the owner in the company. The owners of the 
company take a larger position than those of 
small company because it only requires far 
smaller wealth to control several percentage of 
the company. Size has negative influence on 
insider ownership in line with the research of 
Jensen, et al. (1992). Brigham & Daves (2012) 
declared that in individual company, 
partnership and small company, the owner of 
the company also serves as the manager. This 
does not prevail in big company, where it will 
face serious problem if the shareholders acts 
as managers. Dividend and debt do not have 
any influence on insider ownership in line 
with the research of Jensen, et al. (1992). 
Therefore, proof that dividend, debt, profit-
ability, and sales growth are significantly de-
terminant toward insider ownership is never 
found or there is no a plausible reason to be-
lieve that the company’s management is en-
couraged to own the company’s shares be-
cause of dividend, debt, profitability, and sales 
growth. 
Insider ownership, debt and business risk 
have negative influence on dividend, whereas 
investment, profitability, sales growth, and 
variability of earnings do not have any influ-
ence on dividend. Negative coefficient of in-
sider ownership variable is possibly caused by 
the fact that the shareholders prefer to choose 
the available fund for paying off debt rather 
than receiving dividend. This explanation is 
put forward in relevant with the outcome of 
investment’s negative influence on insider 
ownership and debt’s negative influence on 
dividend. Profitability and variability of earn-
ings do not have any influence on dividend 
along the lines of the research of Adedeji 
(1988). Investment, profitability, sales growth 
and variability of earnings do not have any 
influence on dividend, showing that dividend 
is not determined by investment, profitability, 
sales growth, and variability of earnings. 
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Dividend, business risk, and profitability 
have negative influence on debt, whereas in-
sider ownership, investment, variability of 
earnings, and structure of assets do not have 
any influence on debt. Negative coefficient of 
dividend variable describes that a company 
with high dividend is prone to being selective 
in judging investment, so that it results in the 
low debt that the company uses. Dividend has 
negative influence on debt (Jensen, et al., 
1992; Allen, 1993). Variability of earnings 
does not have any influence on debt corre-
sponding to the research of Adedeji (1998). 
Insider ownership, investment, variability of 
earnings, and structure of assets do not have 
any influence on debt, showing that no proof 
is found to show that insider ownership, in-
vestment, variability of earnings, and structure 
of assets do not significantly determine debt. 
Insider ownership and business risk have 
negative influence on investment, profitability, 
and sales growth have positive influence on 
investment, whereas dividend, debt, and Q 
ratio do not have any influence on investment. 
Negative coefficient of insider ownership 
variable indicates that Indonesian shareholders 
prefer to receive dividend rather than making 
investment in compliance with the research by 
Adedeji (1998). Dividend, debt, and Q ratio do 
not have any influence on investment, 
showing that no proof is found to show that 
dividend, debt, and Q ratio are importantly 
determining investments. 
Insider ownership, dividend, investment 
and size have negative influence on business 
risk, variability of earnings have positive in-
fluence on business risk, whereas debt and 
liquidity do not have any influence on busi-
ness risk. Dividend has negative influence on 
business risk, indicating that companies in 
Indonesia are careful in making investment. 
Debt and liquidity do not have any influence 
on business risk, showing that debt and liquid-
ity do not importantly determine business risk. 
Picture 1 shows the interactions among 
variables of insider ownership, dividend pol-
icy, debt policy, investment decision and busi-
ness risk. The analysis outcome on the equa-
tion of insider ownership, dividend, debt, in-
vestment and business risk indicate that: 1) 
reciprocal correlation is found among insider 
ownership, investment and business risk; 2) 
reciprocal correlation is found between divi-
dend and debt; 3) reciprocal correlation is 
found between dividend and business risk; 4) 
insider ownership influences dividend; 5) 
business risk influences debt. 
Reciprocal correlation among insider 
ownership, investment and business risk indi-
DividendBusiness Risk 
DebtInvestment 
 
 
 
Insider Ownership 
Picture 1.  The Research Outcome on the Interactions among Insider Ownership, Dividend
Policy, Debt Policy, Investment Decision, and Business Risk  
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cates: 1) a company with high level of insider 
ownership is inclined to apply alertness prin-
ciples in making investment and controlling 
the company by making financial policy that 
leads to a low business risk; 2) a company that 
makes large investment will make business 
risk low but the large investment even will 
make management reluctant to own the com-
pany’s shares; 3) a company with high busi-
ness risk will result in the management reluc-
tant to own the company’s shares and the low 
investment that the company makes. 
Reciprocal correlation between dividend 
and debt indicates the large debt the company 
uses for making the reduction of dividend dis-
tributed to the shareholders, contrary to that, 
the large dividend distributed to the share-
holders makes the low debt that the company 
uses because of the company’s alertness in 
making investment. Reciprocal correlation 
between dividend and business risk indicates 
that a company with high business risk will 
give low dividend because of the limited fund 
available for the payment of dividend, and on 
the other hand, the company that gives high 
dividend will make business risk low. 
Seeing the result obtained and comparing 
the proposed hypotheses, we can get hold of 
outcome, showing that the proven hypotheses 
are hypotheses of H1d, H2d, H3d, H3e, H4d, H4e, 
H4f, H5a, H5d, H5f, and H5g. R2 value or deter-
mination coefficient for equation of insider 
ownership is 0, 1650, equation of dividend is 
0, 0419, equation of debt is 0, 0455, equation 
of investment is 0, 2120, equation of business 
risk is 0, 2775. R2 or determination coefficient 
shows the variability of variables that can be 
clarified by the independent variables in such 
equations.  
CONCLUSION, MANAGERIAL 
IMPLICATION, AND RESEARCH 
SHORTCOMINGS  
1.  Conclusion  
The analysis outcome of insider owner-
ship equation indicates that investment, busi-
ness risk, and size have significant, negative 
influence on insider ownership. Insider own-
ership, debt, and business risk gives significant 
negative influence on dividend as can be seen 
from the analysis outcome of dividend 
equation. The significant, negative influence 
of dividend, business risk and profitability 
towards debt can be seen from the analysis 
outcome of debt equation. The analysis out-
come of investment equation indicates that 
insider ownership and business risk have sig-
nificant, negative influence on investment, 
whereas profitability and sales growth have 
significant, positive influence on investment. 
The analysis outcome of business risk equa-
tion shows that insider ownership, dividend, 
investment and size have significant, negative 
influence on business risk, whereas variability 
of earnings has significant, positive influence 
on business risk. 
The interactions among insider ownership, 
dividend policy, debt policy, investment deci-
sion and business risk are; reciprocal correla-
tion is found among insider ownership, in-
vestment and business risk; 2) reciprocal cor-
relation is found between dividend and debt; 
3) reciprocal correlation is found between 
dividend and business risk; 4) insider owner-
ship influences dividend; 5) business risk in-
fluences debt. 
2.  Managerial Implication 
The description of the analysis outcome 
and the managerial implication of the equation 
of insider ownership, dividend, debt, invest-
ment, and business risk indicate that:   
a. The shareholders in Indonesia prefer to 
allocate the obtained profit in the form of 
dividend rather than retaining profit for 
making investment, because dividend is 
considered to give more certainty than in-
vestment. This allocation requires the 
management to notice, as the large profit 
distributed to the shareholder will bring 
about the limited internal fund, which can 
be used for investment, consequently the 
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company will find it hard to develop in the 
future. 
b. The companies in Indonesia are relatively 
not brave to bear risk, as can be seen from 
1) the financial policy made leads to low 
business risk; 2) they are selective in 
making investment, so that investment is 
only made if the company has made suc-
cessful investment in the past and has high 
certainty to make future investment; 3) the 
company prefers internal resource to 
finance investment. Alertness principles 
should necessarily be noticed by manage-
ment, because if the company is very alert 
and selective in making investment, it will 
result in the incapability of the company to 
make good use of investment opportunities. 
3.  Research Shortcomings 
This research has some shortcomings, 
which can be the future research orientation. 
Such shortcomings are:  
a. The utilization of manufacturing compa-
nies registered in Indonesia Stock Ex-
change in 2006 until 2010 as sampling 
data in this research cannot reflect the en-
tire condition of companies in Indonesia. 
The use of samples in each industry is 
good in order to obtain outcome that can 
be compared for each industry. 
b. Insider ownership used in this research is 
insider ownership data, which is acquired 
directly from Indonesia Capital Market 
Directory. The future research should 
utilize insider ownership data, which is in-
directly acquired in order to produce out-
comes that can be compared to the current 
existing proofs. 
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